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RETROACTIVITY IN CIVIL SUITS:
LINKLETTER MODIFIED
The test for determining whether a newly-recognized constitutional safeguard
should be limited to prospective application was first set out by the Supreme
Court in Linkletter v. Walker.' There, a convicted plaintiff, who had exhausted
all state appeal by February 1960, sought to have the exclusionary search and
seizure safeguards announced in Mapp v. ONos (decided in June 1961) applied
to his state prosecution.8 To determine whether a new constitutional rule of
procedure should be applied retroactively as well as prospectively, the Court
must, Mr. Justice Clark stated, "look to the purpose of the Mapp rule; the re-
liance placed upon the [old] doctrine; and the effect on the administration of
justice of a retrospective application of Mapp.'4
In two recent cases, United States ex rel. Jones v. RundleW and Adams v.
Carlson,6 the Linkletter test was applied although the actions were civil in
nature.7 In both of these cases inmates sought to have the constitutionality of
in-prison disciplinary procedures, under which they were confined to punitive
1. 381 US. 618 (1965). See generally Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term-Fore-
word: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Hazv. L.
Rev. 56 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Mishkin].
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. 381 U.S. at 621.
4. Id. at 636. The Linkletter test is often stated as requiring an examination of: " '(a) the
purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a
retroactive application of the new standards.' " Williams v. United States, 401 US. 646,
652-53 n.5 (1971), quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
5. 358 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
6. 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973).
7. The Rundle case arose under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) which provides: "Every person
who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.'
In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 US. 475 (1973), an action under § 1983 was denied to
prisoners who challenged "the very fact or duration of the confinement itself.' Id. at 499.
When such a challenge is made, it should be brought under the federal habeas corpus
statutes; state prisoners would thus be required to exhaust all state remedies before bringing
a federal suit. Id. at 489-90. The court pointed out that a "§ 1983 action is a proper remedy
for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison
life, but not to the fact or length of his custody." Id. at 499. The Preiser case was decided
three days before Rundle and was not considered there. As to the civil damages sought thee,
Preiser made it clear that § 1983 is permitted for that purpose. 411 U.S. at 494. As to the
expungement requested in Rundle, it would seem that such an action would not be a request
to shorten the prison term. Id. at 487. In Rundle, the court spoke of recomputation of
"good time" as a possible equitable remedy, but the prisoner requested only expungement of
the affair from his record (apart from damages). The Preiser case would not negate this
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segregation, determined under due process standards recently announced by the
circuit courts.8
In the Rundle case, an inmate at a Pennsylvania state prison was placed in
punitive segregation after a November 1970 hearing by the prison behavior
clinic.9 Although prisoner Jones was not told the evidence against him, permitted
to explain his actions, nor allowed to have the veracity of a misconduct report
thoroughly investigated,10 the clinic found he had violated prison rules. Jones
brought the action against the prison officials1 ' seeking monetary damages as
compensation for violation of due process and expungement of the affair from
his prison record. The court held that the constitutionally required procedures
for disciplinary hearings (as set out by the Third Circuit in August 197212)
were violated, 18 but still faced the question of the retroactive application of the
suit, although it might qualify some of the dicta in the opinion. See text accompanying notes
76 & 81 infra.
The court in Adams at first had determined that although 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1361
(1970) were the cited bases for jurisdiction, "[t~he underlying cause of action.. must be
based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and we must confront the question of whether Preiser
v. Rodriguez sets a bar to federal jurisdiction of the instant case. We conclude that It does
not." Adams v. Carlson, No. 73-1268 (7th Cir., Aug. 23, 1973) at 1 n.1 (citation & italics
omitted). However, the court amended its opinion on October 4, 1973, eliminating all refer-
ence to the § 1983 cause of action and to the effect of Preser, finding the case
to arise purely under the federal question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) and
the mandamus provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). 488 F.2d at 619, 621 n.1. It Is sub-
mitted that the court's first appraisal of the jurisdictional base was perhaps the more
accurate.
8. The case setting out the new rule for the Third Circuit was Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d
179 (3d Cir. 1972) (civil rights complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief). United
States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 471 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973),
was also invoked, since it followed the Gray case. The case setting out the new rules for
the Seventh Circuit was United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir.
1973).
9. At Graterford Correctional Institution, inmates may be disciplined only after a hearing
by the prison behavior clinic composed of five prison administrators with a majority re-
quired for decision making.
10. United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundie, 358 F. Supp. 939, 942-43 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The
report of a prison guard was the only evidence of rule violation presented at the hearing,
and the only investigation of the report was the asking of that guard if the report was true.
The court found that this was not sufficient. Id. at 943-44, citing Lathrop v. Brewer, 340 F.
Supp. 873, 880-81 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
11. The defendant Rundle was superintendent of the prison and had no direct involve-
ment in the clinic, but he was found to be responsible under § 1983, for, under Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), § 1983 should be read against the background of tort
liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions. Rundlo
could have ordered his subordinates to "inform the accused of the evidence against him."
358 F. Supp. at 948. The argument of immunity from civil liability was rejected. Id. at
948-49.
12. See note 8 supra.
13. Both Gray and Tyrrell relied heavily on the landmark case of Sostre v. McGinnis,
442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972), and adopted the
due process requirements set out in that case: "If substantial deprivations are to be visited
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procedures. The court concluded that the new procedural safeguards should
be applied retroactively where expungement was sought, but only prospectively
where civil damages were requested. 14
In Adams, the inmates were placed in segregation after their participation
in a general work stoppage. Their indefinite segregation was affirmed by the
prison adjustment committee,15 in July and August, although the inmates had
been given neither advance notice of the hearings nor an opportunity to have
the guards' misconduct report investigated.' 0 The inmates alleged irreparable in-
jury and "sought, by motion for a preliminary injunction, immediate relief from
their indefinite segregation without due process . . . ."1 The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals found that its new due process standards (established in May
197318) had been violated. After applying the standards retroactively, the court
ordered new hearings and remanded to the district court for a further deter-
mination of whether the new standards were currently being followed."
Originally at common law, it was assumed-usually without discussion--that
court decisions would be applied retroactively. -' ° In 1940, the Supreme Court
upon a prisoner, it is wise that such action should at least be premised on facts rationally
determined. This is not a concept without meaning. In most cases it would probably be
difficult to find an inquiry minimally fair and rational unless the prisoner were confronted
with the accusation, informed of the evidence against him . . and afforded a reasonable
opportunity to explain his actions." Id. at 198 (citations and footnote omitted). On the
evolution of the "hands off" doctrine to the recognition of federal judicial responsibility in
state prison affairs see Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 175 (1970); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 Yale L.J. 506 (1963).
14. 358 F. Supp. at 952.
15. 488 F.2d at 622. At Marion Penitentiary all major misconduct reports are referred
to an adjustment committee with a duty to "make findings and impose effective goal-oriented
disciplinary action." Id. at 622 n.3.
16. Id. at 622.
17. Id. at 624.
18. United States ex reL Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973). The rules set
out therein provide "that the Constitution requires, as a bare minimum, advance written
notice, a dignified hearing in which the accused may be heard, an opportunity to request
that other witnesses be called or interviewed, and an impartial decision maker." Id. at 716.
19. 488 F.2d at 636.
20. Blackstone, the foremost exponent of retroactivity, concluded that overruled decisions
were not law at all and therefore the overruling decision should be applied to past cases.
1 Blackstone, Commentaries 69 (15th ed. 1809), discussed in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 US.
at 622-23. See generally Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Over-
ruling, 51 Va. L. Rev. 201, 205-16 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Currier]; Note, Retro-
activity of Criminal Procedure Decisions, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1309, 1310-13 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Criminal Procedure Decisions]; Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Appli-
cation in the Federal Courts, 71 Yale LJ. 907, 908-12 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Pro-
spective Overruling].
This theory was applied in its most rigid form in Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US. 425
(1886) which held that unconstitutional action "confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed." Id. at 442; d. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 US. 349,
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opted for prospective application in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter
State Bank,21 where it was recognized that:
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the sub-
sequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects,-with
respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, pri-
vate and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of
prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public
policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application,
demand examination. 22
In limiting the discussion to the narrow res judicata aspects of the case, the
Court failed to provide any structured method for weighing these reliance inter-
ests so important to retroactivity. No doubt this decision was influenced by the
admitted difficulty of the task.
Under the Linkletter criteria there is no assumption that new decisions will
be applied retroactively,23 although there are indications that the courts still
feel it necessary to discredit retroactive application of the given case, rather
than to make a positive argument for prospectivity.24 Under the Linkletter test,
it originally appeared that foreshadowing the new rule in earlier decisions would
be sufficient to justify retroactive application.25 Under the formulation articu-
lated in Desist v. United States,20 however, even if a new constitutional rule
were foreshadowed in earlier decisions, a court could still decide the retroactivity
issue to the extent that the new rule departed from the past.27 This loosening
of the original Linkletter test tended to expand the number and type of recent
decisions accorded prospective application.Ps
372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
103 (1801).
21. 308 U.S. 371 (1940). Cf. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358
(1932) (Cardozo, J., opinion of Court). For a discussion of Sunburst and Justice Cardozo's
views on prospectivity see generally Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of
Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 631 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Schaefer].
22. 308 U.S. at 374.
23. "[We believe that the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective
effect." 381 U.S. at 629.
24. In Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), for example, the Court
stated that "[aifter full consideration of all the factors, we are not able to say that the
[Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)] rule requires retrospective application." Id. at
419. It thus made no positive case for prospectivity.
25. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 734 (1966); accord, Michigan v. Payne, 412
U.S. 47, 55-56 (1973).
26. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
27. Id. at 246. See generally Prospective Overruling, supra note 20, at 944-45; Criminal
Procedure Decisions, supra note 20, at 1309.
There has been much criticism of the foreshadowing principle. See Adams v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 278, 286-87 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
676-77 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 644-45
(Black, J., dissenting).
28. This may be further evidence in support of one commentator's finding that "the
Court has seemed to modify the reasoning of the original decisions whenever that reasoning
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Linkletter, as noted, established a tripartite test. The "[ f] oremost among these
factors is the purpose to be served by the new constitutional rule."20 If this pur-
pose is not advanced by making the rule retroactive, then the rule is to be ap-
plied prospectively. 30 In Linkletter, the Court found that the purpose of the new
evidence-excluding rulings in Mapp v. Ohio was to deter lawless police action31
-a purpose which would not be advanced by retroactivity. The Court pointed
out that it had found a purpose demanding retroactivity in Griffin v. Illinois,32
Gideon v. Wainwright3 3 and Jackson v. Denno,34 where "the princple... ap-
plied went to the fairness of the trial-the very integrity of the fact-finding
process."'35 In making a determination of purpose, the Court must "weigh the
merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in
question . . . ,,"" This weighing process was expanded in Johnson v. New Jer-
sey,37 where the rules of Escobedo v. Illinoisas and Miranda v. Arizonaa0 were
applied prospectively. The Court in Johnson emphasized "that the question
whether a constitutional rule of criminal procedure does or does not enhance
the reliability of the fact-finding process at trial is necessarily a matter of de-
gree.... We are thus concerned with a question of probabilities. .. ."lo The
Court conceded that the purpose of Escobedo and Miranda was to preclude the
possibility of unreliable statements during in-custody interrogation.41 However,
the Court denied retroactive application because, on balance, it found the
danger of actual unreliability was not as great as in overt coercion cases; more-
over, any actual overt coercion proved by petitioners could have been handled
might support general retroactivity." The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91,
138 (1966) [hereinafter cited as The Supreme Court, 1965 Term].
29. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
30. 381 U.S. at 629, 637.
31. Id. at 636-37.
32. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (prohibiting the states from allowing the costs of appeal to
prejudice an indigent, as the equivalent of the denial of a fair trial).
33. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (involving the right of an indigent to have the advice of counsel
at trial, since this right affected the reliability of the trial).
34. 378 US. 368 (1964) (involving the right of an accused to have an involuntary con-
fession excluded).
35. 381 U.S. at 639 (in Mapp, the actual guilt or innocence of the accused was not at
issue).
36. Id. at 629.
37. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
38. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
39. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring warnings before confessions could be used in
evidence).
40. 384 U.S. at 728-29. This loose determination is subject to the same criticism alluded
to in note 27 supra.
41. 384 U.S. at 730. In Tehan v. United States ex reL Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), it was
decided that the purpose of the Griffin rule against self-incrimination did not relate to pro-
tecting the innocent from conviction, but rather to preserving the integrity of the judicial
system. Id. at 415, 418. See note 24 supra.
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under then existing case law. 42 This type of analysis, which seeks to find the
purpose of a new rule and the degree of its effect on the integrity of the fact-
finding process, has led some critics to characterize the Linkletter test as illogical
and confusing.43 Where opinions are unclear, brief, or rendered with several
concurring opinions, unjustified speculation as to purpose may result. Even
where the purpose is clear, uncertainty is likely, for in determining whether
the effect on the fact-finding process is sufficient to require retroactivity, a court
has no guidelines.
The second prong of the Linkletter test relates to the reliance placed on prior
decisions by law enforcement agencies and by the courts. 44 Although reliance
was not found to have been critical in Linkletter,45 in cases like Stovall v.
Denno8 it was used to tilt the balance against retroactivity.47
Since the consequences of prior reliance by law enforcement agencies and by
courts may burden the administration of justice, the latter two elements of the
Linkletter test often are closely related. 48 The extent of this relationship depends
on the particular facts in each case. Obviously, if a decision is accorded retro-
active application, law enforcement agencies can be burdened by an undue in-
crease in the volume of retrials49 and are faced with relocating witnesses to prove
42. 384 U.S. at 730-31. This reasoning in Johnson was followed in Michigan v. Payne,
412 U.S. 47, 55-56 (1973), where the Court refused to apply new resentencing safeguards
retroactively because any actual prejudice could be cured under existing law. For the existing
law referred to in Johnson see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S.
433 (1961).
43. Adams v. Illinois, 409 U.S. 278, 286-87 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part) ; Vaccaro v. United
States, 461 F.2d 626, 631 (5th Cir. 1972) ; United States v. Liguori, 438 F.2d 663, 669 (2d
Cir. 1971) (claiming that Linkletter test is too confusing) ; The Supreme Court, 1965 Term,
supra note 28, at 138-39.
44. See Criminal Procedure Decisions, supra note 20, at 1320.
45. 381 U.S. at 637; accord, Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 251 (1969); see
Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971); Criminal Procedure Decisions 1320.
46. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
47. Id. at 299-300 (law enforcement officials of the federal government and all 50 states
relied on the belief that the Constitution did not require counsel at pre-trial confrontations
for identification); see Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 284-85 (1972). At least one com-
mentator has argued that reliance should be dropped from the Linkletter test. Mishkin, supra
note 1, at 73. For a theory that prospective application should be based on actual reliance
see generally Aera Spark Plug Co. v. B.G. Corp., 130 F.2d 290, 298 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank,
J., concurring). See also The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, supra note 28, at 139, suggesting
that law enforcement officials and lower courts will be encouraged "to take a restrictive view
of constitutional decisions which they consider distasteful, since they will be secure In the
knowledge that convictions obtained by interpreting ambiguous constitutional rules favor-
ably to themselves will not be reversed." Contra, Schaefer, supra note 21, at 643-46.
48. -Criminal Procedure Decisions, supra note 20, at 1320.
49. In Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), the Court cited Call-
fornia's amicus brief which stated that "'thousands of cases were tried in California [one
of six states not having a no comment rule] in which comment was made upon the failure
of the accused to take the stand.' " Id. at 418. See generally The Supreme Court, 1965 Term,
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facts found in cases settled years before.5" It has been suggested that "not forc-
ing the retrial or release of prisoners-plays a disproportionate role in in-
fluencing the decision"3 to apply new procedural rules prospectively.
Quite obviously, in 'a civil case, retroactive application poses different con-
siderations from those in a criminal case. 52 Although civil cases, such as Chicot
County, give us no carefully outlined test of retroactivity, 3 the courts have
focused on the reliance factor in dealing with changes in sovereign and charit-
able immunitya and with the social need for stability factors in divorce, 5
municipal bond,56 contract 57 and property58 cases. When dealing with criminal
cases in areas where statutes have been newly construed and considering whether
to apply a decision prospectively or retroactively, the courts have given the de-
fendant the benefit of the doubt. 59 The Linkletter test differs from these formu-
lations in that it treats constitutionally mandated safeguards, puts great stress
on the purpose of the new rule,60 and provides a seemingly logical and con-
sistent method of determining when to rule in favor of retroactivity. 5 '
Notwithstanding these differences, the Rundle court cited Linkletter for the
proposition that "the principles of retroactivity apply equally to civil and crim-
inal cases" 62 and continued: "Therefore, we will undertake the same type of
analysis in this case, but other factors will become relevant because the effects
of civil remedies may differ from criminal remedies." 63 Unfortunately, the court
supra note 28, at 136; Criminal Procedure Decisions 1321; Comment, Linkletter, Short, and
the Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 832, 839-40 (1966).
50. 382 U.S. at 418-19; Mishkin, supra note 1, at 91; Criminal Procedure Decisions 1321.
51. The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, supra note 28, at 138.
52. See Currier, supra note 20, at 234-35, 241-52; Mishkin, supra note 1, at 77; Criminal
Procedure Decisions 1313-15.
53. In Chicot County, the broad outlines of a test are suggested, but nothing so well
defined as in Linkletter. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
54. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960); see Currier 212-16, 245; Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and
Prospective Overruling, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 20 n.62 (1960). Contra, Muskopf v. Corning
Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (but the legislature denied
application of the decision retroactively).
55. Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445, 448-49 (1848). See generally Currier 210, 243;
Prospective Overruling, supra note 20, at 916-17.
56. Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 679 (1879); Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque,
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863) ; Currier 208-09, 243; Prospective Overruling 917-20.
57. See Spruill, The Effect of an Overruling Decision, 18 N.C.L. Rev. 199, 212 (1940).
58. Id. at 214.
59. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (embezzlement case applied prospec-
tively); State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940) (change in definition of a lottery
applied prospectively); Currier 248-49; Criminal Procedure Decisions, supra note 20, at
1315; Prospective Overruling 923-25.
60. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
61. Criminal Procedure Decisions 1319.
62. 358 F. Supp. at 950.
63. Id.; see Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d at 619 (similar reference to Linkletter).
1974]
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failed to note that Linkletter did not specify that the particular three-pronged
test designed for handling criminal procedure issues was equally suited to civil
cases.
64
In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,6 the Supreme Court
refused to judge the validity of the Third Circuit's attempt to apply Linkletter
to a treble damages action"6 because the judicial rules in question had been
foreshadowed. 67 However, in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,08 a civil damages suit,
the Court did apply part of the Linkletter test. The modified Linkletter formula
considered: 1) the novelty of the rule; 2) the purpose and effect of the rule and
whether it would be furthered or retarded by retroactive application and 3) the
inequity imposed by retroactivity.69 This is significant in that the purpose of a
civil rule was being given great weight, whereas, under the older formulations
applied to civil cases, reliance and stability were usually considered the main
factors.70
64. In Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972), the court said: "There
is almost no suggestion in any of the cases from Linkletter v. Walker through Mackey v.
United States ... that this line of authority should be applied to civil litigation." Id. at 20
(citations omitted). In Linkletter the Court said: "That no distinction was drawn between
civil and criminal litigation is shown by the language used not only in [United States v.]
Schooner Peggy, [5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801)], and Chicot County [Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter State Bank, 308 US. 371 (1940)], but also in such cases as State v. Jones, 44 N.M.
623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940) and James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961)." 381 U.S. at 627
(italics omitted). The Court had relied heavily on Chicot County, a civil case, for the power
of courts to rule prospectively, so it was important to show that no barrier to crimlnal
application was presented there.
65. 392 U.S. 481 (1968); cf. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (per
curiam) ; Alien v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 572 (1969).
66. In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 377 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1967), the
court held: "We believe that retroactivity should be determined from the circumstances of
the particular case, having in mind the purpose which the new rule of law seeks to accom-
plish. ... " Id. at 789.
67. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 496 (1968); see text
accompanying note 25 supra.
68. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
69. Id. at 106-7. See Higley Hill, Inc. v. Knight, 360 F. Supp. 203, 206 (D. Mass. 1973)
(applying the Chevron test to the question of retroactive application of Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972), which had provided new safeguards of notice and hearing before ex parte
attachments of property could be made).
70. In the recent civil case of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973), the Supreme
Court did stress reliance and was obviously concerned with stability. There, the Court
decided that religious schools, providing secular classes under contracts with the State of
Pennsylvania made pursuant to a state statute later declared unconstitutional, were entitled
to payment for services performed prior to the statute's invalidation. The purpose of the
invalidation was to prevent entanglement of the state in religious matters. The Court con-
cluded that this purpose would not be undermined by making payments for services per-
formed prior to invalidation of the statute. The contract nature of this case pervaded the
decision, and the importance of upholding justified reliance on contracts formed under
currently valid statutes undoubtedly greatly influenced the decision.
[Vol. 42
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After showing that the new rules were not foreshadowed,71 the Rundle court
determined that the
major reason for providing due process safeguards for prison disciplinary hearings is
that irrationally, unfairly determined conclusions are not reliable [and] that the single
most important purpose to be served by the new constitutional standards is to increase
the reliability of the fact-finding process.
This conclusion weighs heavily for retroactivity.7 2
Under the normal Linkletter analysis of a criminal case, this conclusion would
be followed. 73
However, in Rundle, where monetary damages were sought, the court said:
"In this civil action regarding prison discipline for monetary damages, the fact
that the major purpose of the constitutional standards is to increase fact-finding
reliability is not as conclusive as it is in criminal procedure."7 4 This represents a
significant change in the priorities of the factors in the Linkletter test since the
"purpose of fact-finding reliability" was the most important factor warranting
retroactivity. In reaching its result the court cited, but did not really apply, the
Johnson balancing test: "'[W] hether a constitutional rule of criminal procedure
does or does not enhance the reliability of the fact-finding process at trial is
necessarily a matter of degree.' "71 Instead, the court found that fact-finding
reliability was of lesser importance in civil cases, in reality ignoring the degree
to which reliability was impaired.
Since other safeguards, such as expungement and restoration of "good time,"
may be employed to protect the plaintiff at least partially, the court decided that
retroactivity was not requiredY6 Where the balancing principle was applied in
71. 358 F. Supp. at 950-51, citing United States ex rel. Arzonica v. Schelpe, 474 F.2d 720
(3d Cir. 1973) which said that Gray and Tyrrell were novel cases. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312
F. Supp. 863 (SMD.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972), the landmark case
setting out procedural safeguards for prisoners, was not settled until after the hearing in
Rundle. In the Rundle opinion, many cases were cited to establish that the Gray rule was
new in the Third Circuit. 358 F. Supp. at 950.
72. 358 F. Supp. at 951. Gray, which set forth the new rule in quoting Sostre v. Mc-
Ginnis, said: " 'If substantial deprivations are to be visited upon a prisoner, it is wise that
such action should at least be premised on facts rationally determined....' " Gray v.
Creamer, 465 F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1972).
Several cases have held that various due process safeguards could be applied retroactively,
since the reliability of the fact-finding process was impaired. See, e.g., Berger v. California,
393 U.S. 314 (1969) (per curiam); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968) (per curiam);
Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968) (per curiam). See also Williams v. United States,
401 U.S. 646 (1971) (holding that fact-finding is the most important factor).
Y3. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971).
74. 358 F. Supp. at 951. The court cites as reasons for this difference: 1) that the con-
sequences of error are not as severe since the prisoner goes from a restricted environment
to a more restricted one, not from freedom to prison, and 2) that the collateral consequences
of a guilty finding are also less. Id.
75. Id. The court quoted Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1966).
76. 358 F. Supp. at 951. The court here cited Cox, supra note 28, at 137, which discussed
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Johnson v. New Jersey, a criminal case, complete protection was afforded by the
alternative safeguard; the civil nature of Rundle led the court to require less
complete protection.77 The serious nature of criminal cases involving loss of
freedom requires different retroactive protection than civil cases involving loss
of property.78
Unlike traditional Linkletter analysis, great stress was put on the effect retro-
activity of civil damages would have on the administration of justice. As seen
earlier, depending on the particular circumstances of each case, reliance and
burden on the administration of justice can be closely related.79 The Rundle
court emphasized the heavy and justified reliance of prison officials on the old
rules and concluded that allowing civil damages to be awarded under these cir-
cumstances would have a "dire effect on prison systems" 80 and, hence, the ad-
ministration of justice.
As to expungement and recomputation of "good time," the Rundle court
reasoned that the burden on the administration of justice would not be as great
because granting this relief would only require a change in each prisoner's file
and a recomputation of his release date.81 Thus, under each remedy, the purpose
and reliance were the same, but it was on the difference in the burden on ad-
ministration of justice that the prospectivity/retroactivity issue was decided.
In arguing that the Linkletter test could be applied in the Adams case, the
Seventh Circuit reasoned by analogy.8 After conceding that the new procedural
rules for disciplinary hearings were not foreshadowed, the court said: "To the
extent that a prison disciplinary hearing may be analogized to a criminal trial,
Linkletter must be our analytical touchstone, for [the case setting out the new
Johnson v. New Jersey and its ruling: "We ... must take account... of the extent to which
other safeguards are available to protect the integrity of the truth-determining process at
trial." Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966). The application of other safe-
guards in Johnson would have given the accused the complete relief to which he was entitled
without requiring the retroactive application of Escobedo and Miranda. See text accompany-
ing note 42 supra. For the effect of the Preiser case on "good time" see note 7 supra.
77. The Johnson Court determined that on balance, of all in-custody interrogation cases,
only in cases of coerced confessions was the truth-determining process in sufficient danger to
require retroactivity. Since Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), had been given retro-
active effect, the alternative remedy of proving actual coercion would give the complete
relief.
78. See Mishkin, supra note 1, at 77.
79. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
80. 358 F. Supp. at 952. The court pointed out that since "Rundle ... may be personally
liable for every minute any prisoner spent in solitary confinement in Graterford Prison
within the reach of the statute of limitations.... The consequence would be the end of the
prison administration because any sensible prison administrator would immediately resign
because it would be virtually impossible for him to protect himself from civil liability." Id.
81. Id. For the effect of the Preiser case on "good time" see note 7 supra.
82. The court may have been influenced in drawing such an analogy since the new rules
which were adopted by the Miller case (see note 8 supra) were heavily based, by way of
analogy, on safeguards required by Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (hearings that
could revoke parole).
RETROACTIVITY IN CIVIL CASES
procedural rules] was concerned almost exclusively with the procedural integrity
of prison hearings." 83 It was further argued "[t]hat the prisoner is convicted
by an administrative prison board instead of a court makes no significant differ-
ence. Nor does it matter that . . . this case arise[s] in a civil rather than a
criminal contextY84
As with the equitable remedies sought in Rundle, the Adams court found that
the new rules should be applied retroactively since they have the purpose of
affecting the integrity of the fact-finding process.8 5 Since there were no alterna-
tive protections to damages available, as in Johnson or Rundle, and no excessive
burden on the administration of justice, the "purpose" aspect of the Linkletter
rule mandated retroactivity.
The modified Linkletter test as applied in Rundle permits great flexibilitys ' in
deciding cases where different consequences flow from different remedies. Also,
in prison cases of this type brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the courts face
many of the same constitutional issues dealt with in the more conventional Link-
letter-type case. From an analytical point of view, the logic of deciding Rundle-
type cases in terms of Linkletter-as opposed to Chicot County's vague con-
sideration of the consequences of reliance-is compelling. It might be argued,
however, that basing the prison official's nonliability on the happenstance that
his detriment also burdens the administration of justice is faulty; what should
be considered is the equity of the official's position in his reliance, as was sug-
gested in Chevron.8 7 Viewed in these terms, it is possible that the Rundle court
was really motivated by the equity of the official's position, but chose to decide
the case on burden of administration of justice grounds to cloak the decision
with the authority of the Linkletter rule.
Under either Linkletter, Chicot County or Chevron, the result reached in
Rundle would be the same as to damages. Whether, under different circum-
stances, the results would still be the same would depend on the courts' willing-
ness to follow formulations regardless of the apparent equities. As to equitable
remedies-with Adams following the Rundle result in finding new disciplinary
hearing safeguards retroactive-it seems that this line of reasoning will be
followed in the other circuits.
Woodrow I. Wilson
83. 488 F.2d at 627.
84. Id. (citation omitted). 0
85. Id.
86. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (given retroactive effect in Walker v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 936 (1972)), the Court prohibited capital punishment but refused to order
retrials of the cases because of the burdens such an order would put on the courts. Robinson
v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973), held that in cases of double jeopardy, capital punishment
similar to that in Furman, and others dealing with non-procedural constitutional issues, the
Linkletter test was not helpful in determining the retroactivity issue and did not have to be
followed. In such cases, the purpose of insuring the integrity of the fact-finding process is
not important.
87. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
1974]
